Policy Networks of Central-Local Government Relations in the UK and Japan and Linkage of International Relations in the EU

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Abstract
Policy networks and linkage are tightly connected concepts in the politics. The policy networks defined by Rhodes are set of formal institutional and informal linkages between government and other actors. The policy networks are important elements in the power-dependence theory about intergovernmental relations. This paper investigates not only policy networks in the UK and Japan, but also linkage in the EU. Organization of this paper is composed of three parts. First, surveyed are the policy networks in domestic politics with power dependence among bureaucracy, central government, party, parliament, politicians, interest groups and local government, and linkage by overall approach on various issues between states in foreign politics. Second, I study condition of the equilibrium between central-local governmental relations by analyzing bargaining of the rate support grant policy by which central government attempted to reduce amount of the rate imposed by the local authorities in the UK. I also explore condition of the equilibrium of the administrative and financial reforms by which central government attempted postal privatization and privatization of national universities in Japan. Third, I investigate linkage in the EU. I discuss condition in which the linkage within the EU is strengthened or weakened. Finally, relationship between policy networks of domestic politics and linkage of the foreign politics is considered for Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement.

Keywords: Policy Networks, Linkage, UK, EU, Japan
Policy networks and Linkage

The policy networks and the linkages have similarity, meanwhile the former is addressed in the domestic power dependence and the latter in the international interdependence. Policy networks are composed of bureaucracy, central government, party, parliament, politicians, interest groups and local government. Policy networks, especially central government and bureaucracy coordinate domestic and foreign issue and policy. Policy-making has been determined by policy networks. Rhodes defines policy networks as set of formal institutional and informal linkages between government and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policy making and implementation (Rhodes, 2006, pp. 423-424). Rhodes continues that the power-dependence approach treats policy networks as set of resource-dependent organizations. Their relationships are characterized by power-dependence (Rhodes, 2006, pp. 432-433). On the other hand, in the world of international relations, Kissinger, a pioneer of the ‘linkage’, describes start of the linkage in the Nixon Administration. Kissinger pointed out that Nixon’s view of Soviet Union was not based on all-or-nothing proposition as his predecessors but rather based on comprehensive approach, that is, linkage on issues with varying degree of solubility. Nixon attempted to synthesize all the elements of the superpower relationship into an overall approach which is neither confrontation nor conciliation (Kissinger, 1994, p. 714). Keohane and Nye pointed out that military and economically strong states will dominate organizations and issues by linking their own policies to other states’ policies, however, when military force is devalued, strong states may still attempt linkages on other issues, trade, shipping or oil (Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp. 30-31). Putnam studied entanglement of domestic and international politics. Putnam takes a case of Japan in which the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), the Economic Planning Agency, and some politicians within the Liberal Democratic Party attempted to promote business interest agenda, using U.S. pressure against the resistance of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) (Putnam, 1988, pp. 427-460).

The power-dependence theory (Rhodes, 1986b) and interdependence theory (Keohane and Nye, 1977) involve the policy networks and the linkage, respectively. In Table 1 compare the power-dependence theory and interdependence theory from researchers, research area, objective, common concepts, law, sanction and stability. In Table 2 also compare the policy networks and the linkage from researchers, research area, objective, common concepts and actor.
Table 1 Comparison between Power-Dependence Theory and Interdependence Theory

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Concept 1</th>
<th>Power-Dependence Theory</th>
<th>Interdependence Theory</th>
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<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Relations between Centre and Local</td>
<td>International Relations among States</td>
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<td>Common Concept 2</td>
<td>Asymmetry between Centre and Local</td>
<td>Asymmetry between States</td>
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<td>Common Concept 3</td>
<td>Cost Unilateral decision is not cost-free.</td>
<td>Cost Short-term sensitivity Long-term vulnerability</td>
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<td>Law</td>
<td>Law, Statute</td>
<td>Treaty, Soft Law</td>
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<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Law with sanction</td>
<td>Treaty and Soft Law without sanction</td>
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<td>Stability</td>
<td>Principle of Ultra Viros</td>
<td>Collective Security and Balance of Power Alliance</td>
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This Table is made by the author based on Rhodes (1986a, 2006), Nye (2007), and Keohane and Nye (1977).

Table 2 Comparison between Policy Networks and Linkage

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<th>Common Concept</th>
<th>Policy Networks</th>
<th>Linkage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Relations between Centre and Local</td>
<td>International Relations among States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common Concept</td>
<td>Linkages between governmental and other actors</td>
<td>Linkage between States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Bureaucracy, Central Government, Parliaments, Politicians, Interest Group Local Government</td>
<td>States International Organizations</td>
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This Table is made by the author based on Rhodes (1986a, 2006), Nye (2007), Keohane and Nye (1977) and Katzenstein (1978).
**Condition of Equilibrium in the UK and Japan**

I consider equilibrium of policies in the UK and Japan. Nash equilibrium of \( n \)-players game is defined as a condition in which every player takes equilibrium strategy to obtain overall performance criterion, that is, a function of \( n \) variables. In other words, if \((n-1)\)-players take equilibrium strategies but for the remaining one player (the \( i \)-th player), the performance degrades (Nash, 1950). If the \( i \)-th player takes selfish strategy only for his interest, the performance criterion meaning ‘cost’ degrades. The equilibrium is institutively understood as a solution of trade-off among players. Although the world of real politics is far from mathematical theory, I study condition of the equilibrium between central-local governmental relations by analyzing bargaining of the rate support grant policy by which central government attempted to reduce amount of the rate imposed by the local authorities. I also explore condition of the equilibrium of the administrative and financial reforms by which central government attempted privatization of the Japan Post and national universities in the Koizumi Administration. Through this analysis I withdraw result about comparison of policy networks in the UK and Japan.

**Rate Support Grant Negotiation in the UK**

The negotiation on the local government expenditure is an appropriate case study to understand policy networks in the UK. Especially, the Consultative Council on Local Government Finance (CCLGF) had been an arena for local government expenditure negotiation between central government and local government from 1975 to 1997. The CCLGF was established in 1975 for negotiation, discussion and information changing of the local finance between central government and local government, and abolished in 1997. In November 1997 the Labour Administration, abolishing the CCLGF, newly established the Central-Local Partnership (CLP), based on A Framework of Partnership agreed between central government and the local government associations. The local government financial issues come to be discussed at the Finance Sub Group of the Central-Local Partnership within the organization of the CLP. The CLP was abolished in 2010.

Before establishment of the CCLGF, the negotiation on the local government expenditure existed as a forum between central government and mainly the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) and the Association of County Councils (ACC). These negotiations on the local government expenditure had strongly been connected with the public expenditure survey (PES) and the rate support grant (RSG) negotiation. The history of the CCLGF can be divided into three eras: previous times of the Consultative Council on Local Government Finance (1970-5), the Labour Administration era after establishing CCLGF (1975-9) and the Conservative Administration era (1979-97). Rhodes noted, in detail, dramatic negotiation process on the local government expenditure between central government and local government associations, along with PES, RSG and the Layfield Committee (Rhodes, 1986a).

During previous times of CCLGF establishment, the forum was held between central government and local government associations, where total expenditure of the local government was fixed as £14.8 billion in 1975/6, and central grant to the local government was decided as £8.4 billion annually. Most amounts of these
negotiations are formalistic (Rhodes, 1986a, p. 102). The statistics of the local authority revenue expenditure shows all expenditures from 1970/1 fiscal year to 1975/6 fiscal year: £ 5.8 billion (1970/1), £ 6.6 billion (1971/2), £ 7.5 billion (1972/3), £ 9.1 billion (1973/4), £ 11.5 billion (1974/5) and £ 14.3 billion (1975/6) (Traverse, 1986, Table App. 2, p. 205). However, the real amounts of distributed RSG are lower than that of negotiation agreement. In fact, the distributed RSG is £ 7.3 billion (1976/7). The statistics of the RSG shows total amount of grant from 1970/1 to 1975/6 fiscal years: £ 2.0 billion (1970/1), £ 2.4 billion (1971/2), £ 2.7 billion (1972/3), £ 3.4 billion (1973/4), £ 4.7 billion (1974/5) and £ 6.6 billion (1975/6) (calculated by author from Table App 10, Traverse, 1986, p. 214).

Originally PES was designed to survey public expenditures and the White Papers were based on PES. The government’s decisions of the local government expenditure is based on the public expenditure survey (PES) rather than realistic projections of local expenditure. Further, survey of the PES is different from the recommendation by the Expenditure Subgroup in the CCLGF, which encompasses six fields; education, housing, home office services, personal social services, local environmental services and local transport finance (CCLGF Organization in 1975). Although the CCLGF subgroup recommended a 5.8 per cent to increase local expenditure for 1971/2, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) proposed a 3.8 per cent increase on the rate of growth of local authority revenue expenditure. Such negotiations continued up to 1975/76 (Rhodes, 1986a, p. 104).

The stance of the central government towards local government is rather unilateral, far from equal partnership. The Association of Metropolitan Authorities paper in 1971 found difficulty in the connection between PES and RSG negotiations. Nevertheless, the association became to be involved in the RSG negotiations between central government and local government. However, the day came when the association understood that this involvement was illusory. The Chancellor announced £ 80 million reduction in May 1973 and £ 120 million reduction in December 1973, without consulting associations. The central government regarded participation of the local associations to the PES just as collecting improved information for decision making by the Cabinet (Rhodes, 1986a, pp. 109-110).

During fiscal years from 1970 to 1975 the economic decline is remarkable and reductions in public spending is seen in 1974/5 and 1975/6 fiscal years. The ratio of pensions’ spending in total spending decreased from 9.8 per cent (1973/4) to 9.7 per cent (1974/5) and 9.5 per cent (1975/6), and ratio of welfare’s spending in total spending decreased from 13.4 per cent (1973/4) to 13 per cent (1974/5) and 12.8 per cent (1975/6) (Nagata, 2015, p. 649). The economic decline and inflation motivated the local government’s reorganization and increases of the local Government’s expenditure. The local authority’s relevant expenditure exceeded the government’s expenditure plans between 1971/2 and 1975/6. The government was against the local government’s overspending the limit set out in PES White Papers and the RSG settlement, meanwhile the associations complained the PES system and government controls of local expenditure (Rhodes, 1986a, p. 106). Especially, the increase of the rate is remarkable in 1974/5 and 1975/6 fiscal years. The increase ratio of the rate per previous year’s rate is 21.5 per cent (1974/5) and 30.2 per cent (1975/6) (calculated by the author from Table App. 3, Traverse, 1986, p. 206).
Two years of 1974 and 1975 are important for local government finance because of the introduction of cash limit, the Local Government Act 1974, the Layfield Committee and establishment of the Consultative Council on Local Government Finance (CCLGF). Although the government intended to apply cash limit (1975) only to central grant but did not intend to design a ceiling for local government’s total spending, however, the local government regarded the cash limit as grant cut (Rhodes, 1986a, p. 108). The Local Government Act 1974 was legislated to codify the rate support grant and the rating. The Layfield Committee aimed to review the whole system of local government finance in England, Scotland and Wales. The CCLGF was established to provide meeting for negotiation on the local government finance. The arena for negotiation between central government and local government had changed from the forum to the CCLGF.

Again, RSG negotiation process will be focused after 1975. The government grant in 1975/6 remarkably increased compared with that in 1975/5; £5,256 million in 1974/5 but £7,172 million in 1974/5 (Traverse, 1986, p. 216). However, the economic situation changed declining in 1976. Rhodes pointed out that 1976 marked not only the beginning of a spirit of partnership in PES but also its end, because of loan by the central government from the International Monetary Bank (IMF) and consequent restriction of the local expenditure (Rhodes, 1986a, p. 127). The PES White Paper (Cmd 6393, HMSO, 1976) announced reduction of local government’s total expenditure in 1977/8 and 1978/9. The local associations had no choice but to accept the government’s action (Rhodes, 1986a, p. 129). Consequently, the local government expenditure in 1977/8 and 1978/9 decreased much, that is, £17,050 million (1983 price) and £13,021 million (1975 price) in 1977/8, and £18,823 million (1983 price) and £12,995 million (1975 price). The degree of the expenditure’s reduction can be understood well compared with that in 1975/6; £15,345 million (1983 price) and £14,790 million (1975 price) (Rhodes, Table Local Government Expenditure from 1975/6 to 1979/80, 1986a, p. 138, Source: Local Government Trends 1983 (London, IPFA, 1984)). What the local associations participated the negotiation at the CCLGF with consciousness of equal partnership cannot be denied. However, the local associations were obliged to follow the guideline of the government, when they confronted unprecedented economic decline and government’s loan from the IMF.

The CCLGF halted its function of the RSG negotiation between government and local associations due to new Conservative Administration. Because new secretary of state, Heseltine, unilaterally announced RSG settlements in 1979/80 and 1980/1. Compared with White Paper, The Government’s Expenditure Plans, 1979-80 to 1982-3 (Cmd 7439), the reduction ratio is 3 per cent in 1979/80 and 5 per cent in 1980/1 (Rhodes, 1986a, p. 140, John, 1990, pp. 7-15). Since 1979 the Conservative Administration did repeat policy making for the local expenditure’s restriction using the statutes and Circulars (Rhodes, 1997, pp. 112-126). The Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 was legislated to institutionalize block grant. The Local Government Finance Act 1982 was legislated to set rate capping. In 1983, GLC and MCC were abolished. The government unilaterally implemented these measures. The poll tax was introduced in the Local Government Finance Act 1988 but soon the poll tax was abolished. Although the CCLGF existed after 1979, these measures have been
implemented without almost negotiation in the CCLGF. The restriction strategy of the local expenditure by the central government raised opposition by the local authorities, therefore, unilateral measures became source of wandering policies.

Here I analyze the equilibrium of the RSG negotiation according to the individual case. Although policy network is autonomous to some extent, the central government had the initiative not only in establishing the CCLGF but also in management of the CCLGF. The associations of the local governments never had the initiative. Therefore, the equilibrium of the RSG bargaining was decided by the central government, because of central power and overspending of the local government. After 1979 bargaining at the CCLGF continued, but stance of the central government became unilateral to the local government. Ironically the unilateral negotiation raised repeated new policies, in other words, wandering policies by the central government.

**Administrative and Financial Reforms in Japan**

**Postal Privatization**

Japan Postal Privatization is the most important reform in a series of the administrative and financial reform in the Koizumi Administration. Policy networks are composed of central government, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, Liberal Democratic Party, and Administrative Reform Meeting. The conflict on Japan Postal Privatization is dispute between the government of Liberal Democratic Party and opposition group consisting of part of Liberal Democratic Party and Democratic Party.

The interim report of the Administrative Reform Meeting, in August 1997, recommended privatization of the services by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, that is, Savings service and Post official insurance service are to be privatized except for Post service. However, the final report of the Administrative Reform Meeting resulted in changing nothing. Distribution of opinions for the Postal Privatization was negative not only in Democratic Party but also in Liberal Democratic Party, due to the reason that the privatization may lead to reduction of the Post service. However, the real reason is that the post office is a favorable voting constituency for many members of Congress.

The Koizumi Administration of the Liberal Democratic Party started in 2001. Prime Minister Koizumi emphasized that the Postal Privatization is the most important core in the administrative and financial reform. Although the postal privatization bills were approved in the House of Representatives in July 2005, the same bills were rejected in the Upper House in August 2005. The Prime Minister immediately made a decision of dissolution of the House of Representatives and appealed necessity of the postal privatization in the referendum. The result of the referendum in September 2005 was a landslide win of the Liberal Democratic Party and the postal privatization bills were approved in the special Diet session in October 2005 (The Nikkei, 2005).

I comment equilibrium on Japan Post privatization. The possibility to realize Japan Post privatization was very low due to the opposition group. Condition of the equilibrium on the privatization was determined by the strong leadership by Prime Minister, Koizumi, especially the result of the referendum in 2005. Without
speculative dissolution of the House of Representatives, this equilibrium would not be successfully obtained.

**Administrative Institution of National University in Japan**

The establishment of the independent administrative institution of national university is a series of the administrative and financial reform in Japan. Policy networks are composed of the central government, Ministry of Education, Liberal Democratic Party, Administrative Reform Meeting and National University during process of institutionalizing independent administrative institution, from 1997 to 2004.

In December 1997 the administrative reform meeting presented final report including comprehensive proposals. The report recommended that although the independent administrative institution of national universities may be an alternative, this plan must be discussed, with long view, to improve research and education, with respecting independency of the universities. Following the legislation of Basic Law for central government offices reform in June 1998, the Cabinet decided fundamental plan for reduction and efficiency of national administrative organizations in April 1999. The national universities held a university presidents meeting in June 1999, in which the presidents decided to start the meeting for discussion on the independent administrative institution. In the president meeting, September 1999, Arima, Minister of Education, announced a statement that the independent administrative institution cannot be applied directly to the existing national universities, therefore, special measure is necessary to the national universities. In May 2000 Liberal Democratic Party presented a recommendation on ‘National Universities from now on’, which coincides with the statement of the Minister of Education in September 1999.

Although Nakasone, Minister of Education, emphasized independent administrative institution can be applicable to national universities, the general meeting of the national universities confirmed against direct application in 2000. The Ministry of Education announced a guideline of administrative reform of national universities in June 2001, called Tohyama Plan. This guideline consists of three objectives; reorganization and integration of universities, introduction of management into national universities and introduction of competition through evaluation system by the third party (Research and Examination Meeting on independent Administrative Institution of National Universities, 2002). All the national universities reluctantly began to negotiate with neighboring universities for integration of universities. In the negotiation process, although the Ministry of Education never directly imposed integration plan to each universities, the Ministry of Education indirectly took administrative control using advice and rejection to the proposed plan by the university.

In April 2004 all the national universities newly started as independent administrative institution. However, management of the universities was under control of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. Though the objective of Tohyama Plan is to strengthen research and education, distributed budget was reduced annually. As a result of the budget reduction, the allocated amount of research budget decreased, the teaching staff supplement became difficult and the teaching staff became busy more than before in documentation of the accountability.
I comment equilibrium on independent administrative institution of the national universities. In the process of independent administrative institution, sharp conflict between Ministry of Education and national universities was not found. Rather in reorganization of the Ministries and Agencies of the government, secret strife between Ministries was remarkable focusing upon which Ministry become a victim of the reorganization. In the work of the reorganization amount of 50,000 persons was estimated to be reduced. Any Ministries and Agencies did not want to be reduced partly. However, amount of the teaching staffs of the national universities was approximately 50,000 persons. The main reason of establishing the independent administrative institution of the national universities is due to the weakest position of the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, another reason is the stance of the national universities against the Ministry of Education. The general meeting of the national university and the president meeting criticized this privatization plan, but they cannot resist thoroughly.

**Linkage of International Relations in the EU**

I consider linkage of the EU agenda in the interdependence of the EU and its Member States. The EU itself has been a linkage from its establishment. Sometimes, threat to the linkage strengthens the linkage again. The Protest in Hungary against the Communist regime was crashed by the Soviet Union (1956) was a motivation for establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Treaty of Rome (1957). This protest in Hungary strengthened the linkage of the Member States of the EEC. The accident of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia against the Soviet Union’s tank (1968) also raised feeling of threat in the European countries and strengthened the linkage of the Member States (EU, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1945-1959_en). The Prague Spring and economic decline in the 1970s motivated participation of the UK to the European Community (1973). This economic risk further proceeded overall reform in the 1980s led by Delors, the eighth President of the European Commission. On the other hand, disparity of cost allocation among Member States weakens linkage of the EU. The Greek financial crisis has been making the EU linkage vulnerable (The Guardian, 2016b). The excessive liability in Greece enforced burden to the Member States and the cost allocation raised question on existence of the EU. Such a disparity of the cost allocation led to the result of British referendum in 2016, the leaving from the EU (The Guardian, 2016a).

**Relationship between Policy Networks and Linkage**

Conflict of interest between Ministries within the same state may influence linkage between states. I investigate relationship between policy networks and linkage. Katzenstein pointed out that ‘today’s international political economy remains unintelligible without a systematic analysis of domestic structures (Katzenstein, 1978, pp. 3-22). In Policy networks, bureaucracy and central government are the most authoritative and influential actors. Prime Minister and Liberal Democratic Party of Japan discusses with bureaucracy and other policy networks in order to make the economic growth and make linkage with the U.S., the UK and the EU. In Japan, the coordination of domestic politics in policy networks affects diplomacy. The domestic politics and foreign policy are relevant. For example, in Japan-EU EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) bargaining, various policy networks, ministries, and politicians have conflict in interest. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry promoted Japan-EU EPA because EPA makes the economic growth and linkage between Japan and the EU. The industrial product association, Keidanren, promoted this EPA. However, the agriculture association, Japan Agricultural Co-operative (JA), opposed Japan-EU EPA due to the same reason of opposition to the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). The agricultural associations feel risky for damage of agricultural product caused by the tariff reduction. They predicted that when the EU requires improvement of access to market on agricultural products, they may lose existing interest. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Fisheries Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism promoted Japan-EU EPA as the member of the government, by showing understanding of opposing opinions of the agriculture association with saying ‘We will guard what should be guarded’. Furthermore, from now on, Japan-US FTA and Japan-UK EPA should also be proceeded.

Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting is also bilateral linkage. In the meeting the ministers recognized shared values of democracy, the rules of law, human rights and open and transparent market. The ministers confirmed that Japan and UK would cooperate to tackle global security changes (Foreign Ministry of Japan, 2016). In Japan-EU EPA, the opinion concerning tariff reduction of agricultural products is influenced to the ministry. However, as the foreign and defence policy is monolithic, the Foreign Ministry of Japan and Ministry of Defence promoted the Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting.

Conclusion

(1) Members of policy network in domestic politics are not equal partnership, because almost agendas are decided by the initiative of the government and bureaucracy. However, what is important is that the equilibrium cannot be reached by only unilateral decision of the government even in the asymmetric power balance. If unilateral decision of the government settles the dispute, there still remains a question why such a lot of time has been consumed for procedures and discussion in the RSG bargaining in the UK, privatization of Japan Post and independent administrative institution of national universities. What is of most importance is the process in which the members of policy network finally ‘persuaded’ after discussion of the dispute with enough time.

(2) The government sometimes requires unilateral control. However, when the government takes unilateral control or bulls the policy, it is not cost-free. The unilateral RSG policy, especially after 1979, was reacted as overspending by the local authorities of the UK. The Conservative Administration was obliged to fall in a chain of unilateral policies.

(3) Confronted national crisis, that is, economic decline and loan of the government from the IMF, the local associations of the UK were obliged to accept guideline of the government in the RSG negotiation.
(4) Sometimes, the threat to the linkage in the EU strengthens the linkage again, as seen in the Hungary Protest and the Prague Spring. On the other hand, disparity of cost allocation among Member States weakens linkage of the EU as seen in the Greek financial crisis.

(5) Conflict of interest groups within the same state may influence linkage between states. The Japan-EU EPA is such case that conflict of domestic interest groups influenced the linkage between Japan and foreign countries, because of damage of agricultural products due to tariff reduction. However, as the foreign and defence policy is monolithic, the Foreign Ministry of Japan and Ministry of Defence promoted the Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting.
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